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Global imbalances associated with the U.S. current account deﬁ  cit have given rise to 
speculation about the nature of the impending adjustment: Will it be smooth and gradual, or 
will it be sudden and costly? This Policy Discussion Paper summarizes the two views and 
then considers three historical periods with similar pressures—an earlier era of globalization 
from 1870 to 1914, the interwar gold standard, and Bretton Woods. A comparison of the 
periods and their outcomes suggests current global imbalances might resolve themselves 
quietly. This paper was originally presented to the Cleveland Committee on Foreign 




Recent concerns over global imbalances associated with the U.S. current-account-deﬁ  cit-to-GDP ra-
tio in excess of 5 percent (see ﬁ  gure 1) and U.S. net foreign liabilities of $2.7 trillion or 25 percent of 
GDP (see ﬁ  gure 2) have raised fears of a drastic readjustment involving a massive depreciation of the 
dollar (as large as 90 percent in some scenarios [Blanchard et al. 2005]). It has already fallen about 30 
percent in nominal trade-weighted terms against our major trading partners (see ﬁ  gure 3)—with at-
tendant potentially serious effects on the U.S. and global economies (see, for example, Obstfeld and 
Rogoff 2004). The adjustment would involve reallocation of consumption and production in the Unit-
ed States from nontraded to traded goods and a possible rise in inﬂ  ation, which would lead to greater 
tightening of monetary policy, which would, in turn, induce a recession. The decline in income would 
reduce both the demand for imports and domestic consumption and encourage domestic saving, si-
multaneously improving the two faces of imbalance—the current account and the savings invest-
ment gap.
At the same time, the adjustment would have opposite effects in Europe and Japan, areas with cur-
rent account surpluses and excess savings (see ﬁ  gures 4 and 5). To the extent that European nominal 
rigidities prevent it from adjusting to the decline in demand for its exports to the United States, its real 
economy could suffer. China, with its currency pegged to the dollar, would not have to adjust much 
and would gain a competitive advantage in the U.S. market—especially against Europe.  
In addition, it is argued that, to the extent that the imbalances have been ﬁ  nanced by foreign—es-
pecially East Asian—central banks’ accumulation of U.S. treasury bills (up to 65 percent of their inter-
national reserves), some point will be reached where these central banks will dump their depreciat-
ing dollar assets and shift their portfolios towards the euro, thereby aggravating the situation.
The current situation is often attributed to the IT boom of the 1990s, which induced a massive 
private capital inﬂ  ow to U.S. equity markets. The bursting of the tech boom (bubble) in 2000, followed 
by 9/11, a U.S. recession, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, led to a shift of the U.S. budget deﬁ  cit 
from surplus to a deﬁ  cit of close to 4 percent of GDP. This twin deﬁ  cit problem is viewed as a key 
determinant of the deteriorating situation (Frankel 2004). 
The Benign View 
An alternate view does not regard the outlook in such bleak terms. It posits that adjustment will be 
smooth, protracted, and benign, very much like what happened in the late 1980s, when the U.S. cur-
rent account deﬁ  cit recorded a peak of about 4 percent of GDP. This view (see, for example, Greens-
pan 2003) stresses the underlying force of ﬁ  nancial globalization—a burgeoning phenomenon since 
the 1970s and one which has encouraged residents of open economies to increase their holdings of 
foreign assets as a way to diversify portfolios and smooth out shocks to consumption. 
Global assets and liabilities have mushroomed in the past three decades, especially in the 1990s 
(Lane and Milesi-Ferreti 2005). Globalization and a decline in home bias—a tendency of domestic in-
vestors to prefer domestic assets in their portfolios—have deepened and broadened ﬁ  nancial markets 
around the world and, above all, in the United States, which has seen a disproportionate growth in the 
demand for its assets because it offers a higher real rate of return based on the economy’s long-run 
good performance. POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 13, JANUARY 2006
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FIGURE 1 CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” 
Federal Reserve Statistical Releases, H.15; and Bloomberg Financial Services.
FIGURE 2 NET INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION—CURRENT COST BASIS
FIGURE 3 NOMINAL TRADE-WEIGHTED MAJOR CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATE
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” 
Federal Reserve Statistical Releases, H.15; and Bloomberg Financial Services.
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” 
Federal Reserve Statistical Releases, H.15; and Bloomberg Financial Services.
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Thus in this view, the current account deﬁ  cit and the rise in U.S. net foreign liabilities reﬂ  ect the 
demand for U.S. instruments by foreigners. Adjustment, to the extent it needs occur, will be benign 
because the underlying long-run positive fundamentals will continue, and for two additional reasons: 
valuation and a reduced pass-through. Valuation effects refer to the fact that, to the extent dollar de-
preciation is unexpected, it will reduce the value of U.S. foreign liabilities (Gourinchas and Rey 2004). 
A reduced pass-through is suggested by recent empirical evidence, which shows that only a very 
small fraction of dollar depreciation passes through to higher inﬂ  ation (Greenspan 2005).   
Globalizing Capital Flows and the Adjustment Mechanism: 
A Benign Outcome a Century Ago
A different and perhaps enlightening perspective on the issue is to delve into economic history for 
earlier episodes of global imbalances, which may have some resonance for today and which may tell 
us what is in store for the future. An important precedent for the benign outcome view is the previ-
ous era of ﬁ  nancial globalization, which took place from 1870 to 1914. It was characterized by a rapid 
FIGURE 4 EURO-AREA’S CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
FIGURE 5 JAPAN’S CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
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global buildup of external assets and liabilities and also of long-standing current account imbalances 
comparable to today’s experience. 
The 50 years before World War I saw massive net private ﬂ  ows of capital from the core countries of 
Western Europe to the countries of recent settlement overseas (mainly the rapidly developing Ameri-
cas and Australasia), ﬁ  nancing railroads and other infrastructure as well as budget deﬁ  cits (especially 
in the form of bonds but also in the form of foreign direct investment). At the peak, the associated 
current account surpluses in Britain reached 9 percent of GDP and were almost as big in France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands (See ﬁ  gure 6). For the principal capital importers in the late nineteenth 
century (Argentina, Australia, and Canada), current account deﬁ  cits exceeded 5 percent of GDP on 
average. Earlier in the century, the United States experienced similar ﬂ  ows but by the century’s end it 
began to run current account surpluses.
In addition, data on ratios of stocks of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP for selected countries 
and regions, compiled in Obstfeld and Taylor (2003), presents a picture of a u-shaped pattern. At its 
pre–1914 peak, the share of foreign assets to world GDP was approximately 20 percent. It declined 
from that level to a low of 5 percent in 1945, with the prewar level only being reached by 1985. After 
that point, it rose to 57 percent by 1995. A similar picture emerges from the ratio of liabilities to overall 
GDP.
The British held the lion’s share of overseas investments in 1914—50 percent—followed by 
France at 22 percent, Germany at 17 percent, the United States at 6.5 percent, and the Netherlands at 
3 percent. By comparison, the United States held 25 percent of global assets in 1995. These funds in 
turn represented up to one-half of the capital stock of one of the major debtors (Argentina) and close 
to one-ﬁ  fth for Australia and Canada. 
FIGURE 6 CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES (PERCENT OF GDP)
SURPLUS COUNTRIES (DURING GOLD STANDARD)
DEFICIT COUNTRIES (DURING GOLD STANDARD)
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A striking feature of the pre–1914 data is the persistence of imbalances in the current account. 
Bordo, Eichengreen, and Kim (1998), using the coefﬁ  cients of an AR(1) regression as well as an aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, ﬁ  nd evidence of signiﬁ  cantly greater persistence in both the deﬁ  cits 
of the principal capital recipients and the capital exporters compared to the recent experience. Simi-
lar evidence is seen in variance ratios calculated by the authors. 
Finally, the mechanism of adjustment to the massive capital transfer worked very smoothly. It oc-
curred through the price-specie-ﬂ  ow mechanism of the classical gold standard (Bordo 1984). The 
transfer of long-term capital from Europe to the New World to ﬁ  nance railroads and other infrastruc-
ture was also accompanied by gold ﬂ  ows as the demand, for example, for U.S. railroad bonds by British 
investors led to a demand for dollars, pushing the dollar to the gold-import point. The gold inﬂ  ows in 
turn tended to raise the price of U.S. exports relative to imports, that is, to improve the terms of trade, 
(as well as raise the ratio of the prices of traded and nontraded goods). It also allowed the United 
States to import more goods than otherwise—much of these imports consisting of capital goods such 
as rails from Britain. As relative prices adjusted, the gold ﬂ  ows would tend to be reversed, closing the 
imbalance. Moreover, short-term capital movements speeded up adjustment as gold ﬂ  ows into the 
United States reduced interest rates relative to Britain. 
Many believe that the smooth adjustment to the capital transfers of the pre–1914 era reﬂ  ects the 
fact that the world was on the gold standard, which provided a stable and credible nominal anchor. 
The gold standard also served as a signal of ﬁ  scal rectitude (“a good housekeeping seal of approval”), 
which assured investors that their debt would be repaid and serviced (Bordo and Rockoff 1996). Also, 
many of the capital recipients were part of the British Empire, which established institutions and 
safeguards that virtually eliminated country risk. For example, colonial (Dominion) governments were 
given debt trustee status in the United Kingdom (which meant they had a de facto British government 
guarantee). 
However, the adjustment mechanism in the earlier era of globalization was not always benign. 
Although current account imbalances were more long-lived in the pre–1914 era than in the recent 
period, they were punctuated in some countries by severe reversals, especially in the crisis-ridden 
1890s (Bordo and Eichengreen 1999). The classic ﬁ  nancial crisis of the era was the Barings crisis of 
1890, which began with a debt default in Argentina and spread like wildﬁ  re to the rest of the emerg-
ing world. Lenders in London and Paris cut off capital ﬂ  ows to emerging countries like Brazil (Triner 
and Wandschneider 2005) with fundamentals similar to those of Argentina, while other countries 
deemed sound, such as Canada, were only marginally affected  (Bordo and Murshid 2000). Thus the 
emerging-market crisis problem had historical precedents. Most of the countries affected, those of 
Latin America and Southern Europe, lacked the fundamentals, speciﬁ  cally, institutions and policies, 
associated with the more successful recipients.       
Although the imbalances of the previous age of globalization has considerable resonance for to-
day—especially the fact that both eras were characterized by stable meta regimes (the gold standard 
then and the adherence by many countries today to credible domestic nominal anchors, such as 
inﬂ  ation targeting and norms for ﬁ  scal balance), there are also considerable differences. First, under 
the gold standard, countries of new settlement—the emerging markets of the time—ran current ac-
count deﬁ  cits, while the major European economies ran surpluses. In the current era, there is no such 
delineation: some major economies run persistent deﬁ  cits, some persistent surpluses, and the same is 
true of emerging-market economies. POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 13, JANUARY 2006
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Second, before 1914, gross capital ﬂ  ows were much smaller than they are today, and gross asset and 
liability positions were very close to net positions, in contrast to today, where most major industrial 
countries are either major creditors or debtors. The earlier pattern reﬂ  ects the prevalence of long-
term investment by the core countries in the countries of new settlement. The substantial growth of 
two-way ﬂ  ows between advanced countries since 1980 has been associated with both international 
ﬁ  nancial diversiﬁ  cation and intertemporal consumption smoothing.
Third, the adjustment mechanism is different. The historical record shows that adjustment to the 
signiﬁ  cant and persistent external imbalances in the pre-1914 era occurred largely through the Hu-
mean price-specie-ﬂ  ow mechanism of the classical gold standard. In contrast, the global economy is 
now on a managed ﬂ  oating exchange rate regime, and instead of gold ﬂ  ows, the brunt of the external 
adjustment occurs through changes in the exchange rate and international reserves, along with rela-
tive price movements, short-term capital ﬂ  ows, and valuation effects (Obstfeld 2004).
Finally, in the pre–1914 era, Great Britain was the dominant country. Its currency, the pound, served 
as the international medium of exchange and as a key reserve asset. Great Britain ran considerable cur-
rent account surpluses throughout the period. By contrast, the United States is the dominant economy 
today and the dollar is the key currency, but the United States has been running persistent current 
account deﬁ  cits.
Further Lessons from History: Some Bad Outcomes
History also gives two other, not-so-rosy scenarios of global imbalances and how they were adjusted 
to: the interwar gold exchange standard and the Bretton Woods system.
The Interwar Adjustment
World War I ended the classical gold standard as all of the belligerents except the U.S. abandoned gold 
convertibility. Private capital ﬂ  ows also ceased. After the war, by 1926, the major countries returned to 
a variant of the gold standard, the gold exchange standard in which members held most of their inter-
national reserves in dollars, sterling, and francs, and the U.S., Great Britain, and France held gold. 
But the interwar gold exchange standard had serious ﬂ  aws, which prevented smooth adjustments 
to the imbalances that built up (Meltzer 2003, Eichengreen 1992). The key problem was that the major 
countries returned to gold at misaligned real exchange rates. All the belligerents had serious inﬂ  ations 
during the war, and the restoration of the original gold parities involved deﬂ  ation and recession. As it 
turned out, Britain restored parity at $4.86 with an overvalued real exchange rate while France and 
Germany each greatly devalued their currencies and restored parities at undervalued real levels (see 
ﬁ  gure 7). Although the United States never left the gold standard during the war, U.S. prices did not 
return to the prewar level, so that the country’s postwar real exchange rate was also undervalued. 
This misalignment meant that the United States, France, and Germany tended to run current account 
surpluses while Britain, its empire, and the countries economically linked to it ran deﬁ  cits. Under the 
gold standard, this meant that gold tended to ﬂ  ow toward the surplus countries. Also, under the gold 
standard rules, both creditors and debtors were supposed to adjust to the imbalances—creditors by 
allowing domestic price levels to rise, debtors by deﬂ  ation. As it turned out, both the United States 
and France continuously sterilized their gold ﬂ  ows and prevented adjustment (Meltzer 2003). As a 
consequence, they imposed deﬂ  ationary pressure on Britain and on the rest of the world. 
Another important difference between the classical and interwar gold standards that impaired the 
adjustment mechanism in the latter was the lack of credibility in the member countries’ adherence to FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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gold convertibility. Unlike in the earlier period, markets had limited conﬁ  dence that countries would 
always put external balance considerations before domestic policy concerns (Eichengreen 1992). 
This meant that short-term capital movements could be destabilizing. In the end, the system collapsed 
after 1929 in the face of the Great Depression. Speculative attacks against countries that used expan-
sionary monetary policy to alleviate banking panics and to stabilize the real economy forced country 
after country to abandon the gold standard (Eichengreen 1992). This was not the case for the United 
States however; it had adequate gold reserves to withstand speculative attacks (Bordo, Choudhri, and 
Schwartz 2002).  The United States left the gold standard in 1933 as part of Roosevelt’s policy package 
to reﬂ  ate the U.S. economy (Meltzer 2003).       
The Bretton Woods Adjustment
Under the post–World War II Bretton Woods system, a distant variant of the gold standard, the United 
States was the dominant country, with the largest gold reserves (Bordo 1993). Under Bretton Woods’ 
rules, the United States had to peg the dollar to gold at $35.00 per ounce, and the rest of the world 
pegged to the dollar. The rest of the world used dollars as international reserves, and the dollar served 
as the international medium of exchange. The United States was also supposed to follow stable mon-
etary and ﬁ  scal policies. 
During the period 1959–1971, when the system fully operated (most members had current ac-
count convertibility), the United States ran persistent current account and trade surpluses and also 
engaged in considerable foreign investment. The overall balance of payments was generally in deﬁ  cit 
and the rest of the world absorbed dollar claims (see ﬁ  gure 8). At the same time it is argued that the 
principal continental European countries and Japan kept their real exchange rates deliberately un-
dervalued in order to foster export-driven growth in their economies (Dooley et al. 2002). This policy 
meant that they kept accumulating dollars, which they sterilized, just as the United States and France 
had during the interwar period. It has been argued that during this period, the United States acted 
as ﬁ  nancial intermediary to the rest of the world, importing short-term capital (dollar claims) and 
exporting long-term capital (McKinnon 1969).
From 1961 to 1967, Europe and Japan’s holding of dollar claims convertible into gold kept increas-
ing relative to gold holdings in the United States, suggesting the possibility of a run on the dollar (see 
ﬁ  gure 9).
FIGURE 7 REAL EXCHANGE RATES (CPI)
Note: The dollar–pound parity in 1925 was $4.86, and the dollar–franc parity 
in 1927 was $0.0392.
Source: Bordo et al. 2001.
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McKinnon (1969), Meltzer (1991), and others have argued that the system could have continued 
for an extended period as a de facto dollar standard. However, two factors led to the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system. First, the French resented the United States’ “exorbitant privilege” of not hav-
ing to adjust to its payments imbalances because it was the principal reserve country. They wanted 
a return to a pure gold standard, and to facilitate this outcome, they converted their outstanding 
dollar claims into gold. Second, the United States began to follow inﬂ  ationary monetary and ﬁ  scal 
policies beginning in 1965—to ﬁ  nance the Vietnam War and the Great Society. 
The expansionary policies increased both the U.S. payments deﬁ  cit and European central bank 
reserves, as the United States exported its inﬂ  ation abroad. As a consequence, the Europeans began 
converting their dollar claims into gold, threatening U.S. gold reserves. The system collapsed when 
Richard Nixon closed the gold window in August 1971. 
It has been argued that a reincarnated Bretton Woods system exists today. China, possibly India, 
and other countries are seen as deliberately running an undervalued peg against the dollar to en-
courage export-driven growth the way Europe and Japan did 40 years ago (Dooley et al. 2002). The 
central banks of these countries willingly accumulate dollar assets consequent upon their current 
FIGURE 8 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: UNITED STATES, 1950–1971 (MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)
FIGURE 9 MONETARY GOLD AND DOLLAR HOLDINGS: THE UNITED STATES AND THE REST OF 

















U.S. monetary gold stock
Rest of the world 
monetary gold stock
External dollar liabilities 
held by monetary authorities








0FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
9
References
Blanchard, Olivier, Francesco Giavazzi, and Filipa Sa. “The U.S. Current Account and the Dollar.” National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, no. 11137, February 2005.
Bordo, Michael D., Ehsan Choudhri, and Anna J. Schwartz. “Was Expansionary Monetary Policy 
Feasible During the Great Contraction?” Explorations in Economic History, January 2002. 
Bordo, Michael D., Barry Eichengreen, Daniela Klingebiel, and Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria.
“Is the Crisis Problem Growing More Severe?” Economic Policy, vol. 32 (April 2001), pp. 53–82.
Bordo, Michael D. , and Antu Murshid. 2001, “Are Financial Crises Becoming More Contagious:  What 
is the Historical Evidence on Contagion?” In Stijn Claessens and Kristin J. Forbes (eds.), International 
Financial Contagion, Boston: Kluwer, 2001, pp. 367–403.
Bordo, Michael D.,  and Barry Eichengreen.  “Is Our Current International Economic Environment 
Unusually Crisis Prone?” In David Gruen and Luke Gower (eds.), Capital Flows and the International 
Financial System, Sydney: Reserve Bank of Australia, 1999, pp.18–75.
Bordo, Michael D., Barry Eichengreen, and Jong Woo Kim.  “Was There Really an Earlier Period of 
International Financial Integration Compared to Today?” In The Implications of Globalization of 
world Financial Markets. Seoul:Bank of Korea, 1998.
Bordo, Michael D., and Hugh Rockoff.  “The Gold Standard as a Good-Housekeeping Seal of Approval.” 
Journal of Economic History, vol. 56 (1996), pp.389–428.
Bordo, Michael D. “The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical Overview.” 
In Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen (eds.), A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
account surpluses. Dooley et al. argue that such a relationship could persist for as long as a decade to 
allow China to absorb its 200 million surplus agricultural workers into the manufacturing sector. 
Others argue that the reincarnated system will not last for 10 years but will collapse much sooner 
because, unlike the Europeans in the 1960s, Asian central banks do not have a stable cartel (Eichen-
green 2004). Furthermore, in the Bretton Woods era, there were no good substitutes for the dollar as 
the world’s reserve asset (the pound was a reserve asset, but it was weak), but today we have the euro. 
They predict the system will collapse quickly. 
What Will Happen?        
We have illustrated three historical episodes of external imbalances and their adjustment. Two ended in 
a collapse. The third worked remarkably well. Which episode is more relevant to today’s environment? 
My bet is a benign outcome, like that of the prewar gold standard era. In today’s world, the underlying 
fundamental of globalization and the basic strength of the U.S. economy—which will continue to un-
derpin the dollar as a reserve asset—suggest that adjustment to the present set of imbalances will be 
gradual, and, when all is said and done, the experience will be viewed as similar to what happened in 
the late 1980s.    POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 13, JANUARY 2006
10
Bordo, Michael D.  “The Gold Standard: The Traditional Approach.” In Michael D. Bordo and 
Anna J. Schwartz (eds.) A Retrospective on the Classical Gold Standard, 1821–1931. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1984.
Dooley, Michael P., David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber.  “An Essay on the Revived Bretton Woods 
System.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, no. 9971 (September 2002).
Eichengreen, Barry.  “Global Imbalances and the Lessons of Bretton Woods.” National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper, no.  10497 (2004).
Eichengreen, Barry. Golden Fetters. New York Oxford University Press, 1992. 
Frankel, Jeffrey.  “Twin Deﬁ   cits and Twin Decades,” unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, 
May 2004.
Greenspan, Alan.  “Current Accounts,” remarks given at the Advancing Enterprise 2005 conference, 
London, England, February 4, 2005.
Greenspan, Alan. Remarks on the 21st Annual Monetary Conference, cosponsored by the Cato 
Institute and the Economist. Washington, D.C. , November 20, 2003.
Lane, Philip R., and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti. “Financial Globalization and Exchange Rates,” Interna-
tional Monetary Fund Working Paper, no. 05/03 (2005).
Mckinnon, Ronald. “Private and Ofﬁ  cial Money: The Case for the Dollar.” In Princeton Essays in Inter-
national Economics. Princeton University, International Finance Section, 1969.
Meltzer, Allan.  A History of the Federal Reserve, vol. I, 1913–1951. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2003. 
Meltzer, Allan. “U.S. Policy in the Bretton Woods Era.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review, vol. 73 
(May/June 1991), pp. 54–83.
Obstfeld, Maurice. “External Adjustment,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper, no. 10843 (October 2004). 
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff.  “The Unsustainable Current Account Position Revisited,” 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper,  no.  10869 (October 2004). 
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Alan Taylor. Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis and Growth. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, and Helene Rey.  “International Financial Adjustment” National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper, no. 11155 (2005).
Triner, Gail, and Kirsten Wandschneider.  “International Capital and the Brazilian Encilhamento, 
1889–1892: An Early Example of Contagion among Emerging Markets.” Financial History Review 
(2005).papers
p d





Please send corrected mailing 
label to the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland, Research 
Department, P.O. Box 6387, 
Cleveland, Ohio 44101.
Presorted Standard
U.S. Postage Paid
Cleveland, OH
Permit no. 385